Abstract-In this paper, we analyze and improve WIPR, an RFID identification scheme based on public key techniques with efficient hardware implementation. First we analyze the security and privacy features of WIPR. We show that a reduced version of WIPR is vulnerable to short padding attacks and WIPR needs a random number generator with certain properties to withstand reset attacks. We discuss countermeasures to avoid these attacks. Then we propose two variants of WIPR, namely WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS, to improve its security and to further reduce its hardware cost. Using an additional hash function, WIPR-SAEP achieves provable security in the sense that violating the security properties leads to solving the integer factoring problem. WIPR-RNS uses a residue number system (RNS) for computation, and reduces the hardware costs of WIPR. WIPR-RNS provides a better security guarantee than WIPR in that it does not use a nonstandard cryptographic primitive in WIPR. WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS can be combined into one scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an automated object identification technology. RFID systems consist of two main components: tags and readers. Tags are small radio transponders. They contain the identification information of objects to which they are attached. Readers query these tags for the identifying information about the objects. Readers often have secure access to a back-end database. For simplicity, a reader and a backend database can be treated as a single entity.
While RFID technology holds great promise in a wide range of applications such as supply chain, anticounterfeiting, and libraries, it also raises significant privacy and security concerns. Since RFID tags respond to radio interrogation automatically, malicious scanning of tags is a practical threat. Even if the information emitted by a tag is encrypted, the information may
The second author's research is supported by NSERC discovery grant 203114-06. be used to track the tag, thus causing privacy issues. An equally significant problem is authentication. One purpose of RFID tags is to prove the authenticity of objects. If an RFID tag can be scanned and replicated, then a counterfeit tag can be made to impersonate the authentic one.
RFID protocols must provide privacy and authenticity under these possible attacks. In addition, an RFID protocol also needs to be scalable and efficient. An RFID system may have millions of tags. The RFID protocol must be scalable to allow the reader to deal with such a large number of tags. On the other hand, a tag has very limited computing and storage capacity, so the protocol must be efficient enough to be executable by a tag.
To design an RFID protocol satisfying all the desired privacy, security, scalability, and efficiency properties is challenging. Due to the limited resources of RFID tags, most existing solutions are based on symmetric key cryptographic tools. Using symmetric key techniques, secure authentication relies on a symmetric key shared between a tag and reader. However, privacy makes RFID authentication different from conventional cryptographic authentication. For privacy, a tag cannot identify itself to a reader before an authentication interaction, thus the reader does not know which key to use in the interaction. A straightforward solution is for the reader to try every key. This is prohibitively costly when the number of tags becomes large. Literature in this area has sought to reduce the cost of key search. Every such protocol proposed so far involves some kind of tradeoff among the desired properties [9] .
If public key cryptosystem can be used, then it would be easier to solve the key search problem. Whether a public key cryptosystem can be implemented on RFID tags remains an open problem and has drawn much effort. In [11] , Oren and Feldhofer proposed WIPR, an RFID identification protocol based on a randomized Rabin encryption scheme. WIPR is very efficient in hardware, requiring only 5705 gates, and its design aims at strong security and privacy requirements. While Oren and Feldhofer provided an implementation of the protocol, they also note that some details of the protocol design have not been fully analyzed.
Our Contribution.
In this paper, we analyze the security and privacy features of WIPR. We show that a reduced version of WIPR is vulnerable to short padding attacks and WIPR needs a random bit generator (RBG) with certain properties to withstand reset attacks. We discuss countermeasures to avoid these attacks by properly specifying the details of the protocol. Then we propose two variants of WIRP, WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS, to provide better security and to further reduce the hardware cost. WIPR-SAEP uses an additional hash function to achieve provable security. WIPR-RNS uses a residue number system (RNS) computation to reduce the hardware cost of WIPR. WIPR-RNS may also provide better security guarantees in that it uses standard cryptographic primitives instead of the non-standard ones in WIPR. The two changes (SAEP padding and RNS computing) can be used independently or combined together.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review some preliminary background and related works. In Section III, we analyze WIPR. In Section IV, we present WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS. Section V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
Hereinafter, we use |x| to denote the length of a bit string x, and we use x||y to denote the concatenation of strings x and y.
Integer Factoring Problem. Let N = pq where p and q are large primes and |p| ≈ |q|. The factoring assumption says that given N , for any polynomial time (in |N |) algorithm A and any polynomial Q, for sufficiently large |N |, it holds that Pr[(p, q) = A(N )] < 1/Q(|N |), i.e., it is infeasible to factor N in polynomial time (in |N |) with nonnegligible probability. |N | = 1024 is often chosen in practice.
Rabin Function. Let (N, p, q) be the parameters in the factoring assumption, and in addition, p ≡ 3 mod 4 and q ≡ 3 mod 4. The Rabin function computes y = x 2 mod N, x ∈ Z * N . The Rabin function is a trap-door oneway function in that given y = x 2 mod N , without (p, q), to find x such that y = x 2 mod N is as hard as factoring N . With (p, q), x can be computed in polynomial time. Note that there are four distinct x values such that x 2 = y mod N : ±x and ±αx where α is a nontrivial square root of 1 mod N (i.e., α 2 = 1 mod N and α = ±1 mod N ). Given x and αx, one can factor N [14, §5.8].
Randomized Rabin Function. Shamir [12] and Naccache [10] simultaneously proposed a randomized Rabin function. Instead of computing y = x 2 mod N , the randomized Rabin function computes y = x 2 + rN where r is a random number. The randomized Rabin function is as secure as the Rabin function when |r| is big enough (|r| ≥ |N | + 80 is recommended). The ways to compute y = x 2 + rN in [12] and [10] are different. In [12] , the numbers x, r and N are represented using a regular number system and the multiplication is conventional multiplication. In [10] , the numbers are represented in a residue number system (RNS) and the multiplication is RNS multiplication. An RNS has a list of coprime numbers 
In [5] , several attacks are identified for the RSA function with short padding and a small encryption key (i.e., y = x 3 mod N ). The same attacks apply to the Rabin function as well (i.e., y = x 2 mod N ). We list these attacks, and rewrite them for the Rabin function as follows.
1) The padding function is x = c||m where c is known to the adversary and |m| < |N |/2. Given the ciphertext y = (c||m) 2 mod N , m can be computed as follows: Let C = 2 |m| c. Then it holds that
(1) is a univariate polynomial in m of degree 2 (mod N ). Since |m| < |N |/2, m can be computed using the Coppersmith algorithm.
2) The padding function is x = r||m where r is a random string and |r| < |N |/4. Given two ciphertexts y 1 = (r 1 ||m) 2 mod N and y 2 = (r 2 ||m) 2 mod N for the same plaintext m, m can be computed as follows:
where x 1 and ∆ are unknowns. x 1 can be eliminated from (2) and (3) by taking their resultant 1 , and it is easy to verify that the resultant equals to 0:
(4) is a univariate polynomial in ∆ of degree 4 (mod N ). Since |∆| < |N |/4, ∆ can be computed using the Coppersmith algorithm.
From (2) and (3) we have
then we can solve for x 1 and compute m by parsing x 1 = r 1 ||m.
SAEP Padding. In [4] , Boneh proposed Simple OAEP (SAEP), a padding scheme for Rabin function which is provably secure in the sense that breaking the Rabin-SAEP scheme leads to factoring N . The SAEP padding is as follows: x = m||o ⊕ h(r)||r where r is a random string, |r| > |N |/2, o is a string of 0's, |m| < |o|, and h is a hash function. The Rabin-SAEP encryption provides semantic security under chosen ciphertext attacks, which implies semantic security under chosen plaintext attacks, meaning that even if the adversary can choose the plaintext m, he is not able to distinguish the ciphertext from a random string of the same size. The security proof is in the random oracle model which assumes h to be a random oracle. The proof is based on the Coppersmith Theorem.
The connection between our work and the above related work is as follows. WIPR is closely related to Shamir's randomized Rabin function using a simple padding, which may be vulnerable to the short padding attacks. One of our improvements to WIPR is to use RNS computation, which is similar to Naccache's randomized Rabin function. The other improvement is to use a secure padding similar to SAEP.
III. WIPR

A. Description
Setup. Let (p, q, N ) be the parameters of the Rabin function and let |N | = 1024. In the scheme, RFID tags are provided with the public key N and a reader is provided with the secret key (p, q). Each tag is assigned with an ID.
Challenge. Reader generates a random bit string c where |c| = 128, and sends c to the tag.
Response. The tag generates a random bit string r, computes x = M IX(c||r||ID) where M IX is a simple byte-interleaving operation. The tag generates a random number r where |r | = 1024 + 80, then computes y = x 2 + r N , and sends y to the reader.
Verify. The reader solves x 2 mod N = y mod N for x. There are four roots. The reader checks if one of the roots contains c. If such a root is found, then the reader parses the root and finds ID.
WIPR is designed to provide the following properties:
• Secrecy. An adversary observing a protocol exchange between a reader and a tag cannot learn anything about the ID of the tag.
• Full backward and forward privacy. An adversary cannot determine whether a tag was a part of any past or future protocol exchange it has recorded, even if the adversary knows the ID of the tag. The framework of WIPR is the same as Shamir's randomized Rabin function in [12] . The main novelty in WIPR is to use a reversible stream cipher to generate a long pseudorandom string on the fly which can be accessed forward and backward. The design of the reversible stream cipher is as follows. Let s i be the i th state of the stream cipher. To transfer to the next state, the cipher computes s i+1 = s i−1 ⊕ f (s i ) where f is a oneway function. The cipher can also transfer to the previous state by computing s i−1 = s i+1 ⊕ f (s i ). WIPR uses a boolean function to implement the oneway function f . The authors of WIPR noted that the boolean function is somewhat insecure.
WIPR did not specify some details of the scheme such as the M IX function and the sizes of ID and r. The authors of WIPR noted that the parameter sizes need to be fine-tuned, based on the relative strengths of attacks against the scheme's various subcomponents.
B. Analysis 1) Short Padding Attacks Against a Reduced WIPR: WIPR uses a padding scheme x = M IX(c||r||ID) before computing y = x 2 mod N . 2 We consider a reduced version of WIPR where the M IX function is not used (i.e., x = (c||r||ID)). We discuss how the length of r affects the security of the protocol.
First, we show that, if |r| < |N |/4 = 256, then an adversary can compute the ID of a tag after querying the tag twice. The adversary queries the tag twice with the same challenge c, and receives y 1 = (c||r 1 ||ID) 2 mod N and y 2 = (c||r 2 ||ID) 2 mod N. The number x = c||r||ID can be expressed as x = ac + br + ID where a = 2 |ID|+|r| and b = 2 |ID| . Let x 1 = ac + br 1 + ID and let ∆ = (r 2 − r 1 ). Then the adversary has
and he can solve for ∆ and x 1 as shown in case (2) of the short padding attacks in Section II. Then ID can be found within x 1 .
Next, we show that, when |r| < |N |/2 = 512, the scheme does not provide forward or backward privacy. Suppose the adversary gets a tag ID at some time. To tell if a message (c, y) observed at some other time involves this same ID, the adversary solves the equation
for r using the Coppersmith algorithm. If (c, y) is generated using the ID, i.e., y = (c||r||ID) 2 mod N for some r where |r| < |N | 2 , then according to the Coppersmith Theorem, the adversary can compute this r and verify that y = (c||r||ID) 2 mod N . In this case, the adversary concludes that (c, y) is generated by this ID. In the other case where y is generated from another tag ID , i.e., y = (c||r ||ID ) for some r , we show that there does not exist an r such that (c||r||ID) 2 mod N = y. If such an r exists, then it can be computed using the Coppersmith algorithm. Now we get two square roots of y: x 1 = c||r ||ID and x 2 = c||r||ID. It is unlikely that x 1 = −x 2 since ID and ID are independent, thus we can factor N using x 1 and x 2 . Therefore, in this case, the Coppersmith algorithm will not output r such that |r| < 512 and (c||r||ID) 2 mod N = y. Upon this result, the adversary can conclude that (c, y) is not related to the ID. Therefore, the adversary can successfully tell if the message (c, y) is related to a given ID. This attack is based on case (1) of the short padding attacks in Section II.
2) Parameter Choice for WIPR: Two basic countermeasures can be taken in WIPR to withstand the short padding attacks.
• use a random padding with a length greater than 512 bits. In this case, even without a M IX function, the above short padding attacks do not work.
• use a M IX function to spread the random padding into at least three separated blocks, e.g., M IX(c||r||ID) = (r 1 ||ID||r 2 ||c||r 3 ) where r = r 1 ||r 2 ||r 3 . In this case, even when |r| < 256, the above short padding attacks does not work, either. Note that if r is separated into only two blocks, an attack is still possible, although the computation is more complicated and results are not guaranteed [5] .
It is reasonable to assume that longer random paddings and more separated padding blocks are more resistant to the short padding attacks. In practice, c is 128 bits and we assume that ID is 128 bits, then r is 768 bits. A M IX function may divide r into 32 3-byte blocks, and insert one byte of c||ID after each block (note that both the input and output of M IX are generated on the fly).
3) Reset Attacks: In WIPR, a reversible stream cipher is designed to extend a short random string to a long pseudorandom string. Three such ciphers are used in WIPR. We note that the reversible stream cipher only serves to extend a short random seed to a long pseudorandom string for one identification session. One seed is needed for each individual session. Therefore, an additional random number generator is needed for WIPR. We denote this random number generator as RBG 1 .
To ensure the security and privacy properties of WIPR, RBG 1 should be resistant to reset attacks, where the adversary can reset a tag's internal state to its initial state. Reset attacks have been considered for standard identification protocols in the smartcard setting [1] , and they have recently been considered for RFID systems [2] . If RBG 1 is a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG), and its output only depends on a secret initial seed, then the output of RBG 1 can be repeated after resetting. In this case, the adversary can recover the tag ID as follows. The adversary resets the tag, queries it with c 1 , and gets the response y 1 = (M IX(c 1 ||r||ID)) 2 mod N . The adversary resets the tag again, queries it with c 2 , and gets the response y 2 = (M IX(c 2 ||r||ID)) 2 mod N . The adversary chooses c 1 and c 2 such that they differ at only one bit. Suppose this bit is the i th bit b i in x = M IX(c||r||ID) = x 1 ||b i ||x 2 , and b i = 1 in c 1 . Then the adversary can solve
mod N for x 1 ||0||x 2 and recover ID.
If RBG 1 is a true random bit generator, then the reset attack does not work. When RBG 1 is a PRBG, one way to avoid the above reset attack is to let the output of the RBG 1 depend on the challenge c. In this case, the above reset attack does not work, either.
We note that, if RBG 1 is a PRBG, then to ensure the forward and backward privacy of the protocol, the PRBG should also provide forward and backward security. More detailed discussion of these issues can be found in [15] .
IV. IMPROVEMENTS
When the padding length is long enough and the M IX function is properly designed, WIPR can be considered secure based on the fact that, despite considerable research interest over the last 30 years, there is still no way of performing Coppersmith-type attacks on ciphertexts in which c (known), r (random padding), and m (secret) are sufficiently mixed. However, as for any cryptographic protocol, a "provable security" is usually preferable to a security based on "no known attacks". Informally, provable security means that, in a given security model, breaking the protocol leads to solving some hard problem, e.g., the integer factoring problem.
An essential building block of WIPR is the reversible stream cipher. The reversible stream cipher uses 1238 gates, which is highly lightweight and is critical for WIPR to be useful on RFID tags. However, as a cryptographic primitive, the reversible stream cipher has not received extensive public scrutiny, and hence, it may raise concerns about its security. It would be desirable to substitute it with a well studied cipher. Also, we are interested in investigating possible ways to further reduce the hardware cost of WIPR without affecting its security.
Next, we propose two approaches to improve the security and to reduce the hardware cost of WIPR. The first is a secure padding based on SAEP. The resulting scheme is denoted as WIPR-SAEP. The major additional hardware cost for WIPR-SAEP is a hash function. WIPR-SAEP is provably secure in the sense Fig. 1 . Rabin-SAEP and WIPR-SAEP Padding that violating the security and privacy of the scheme leads to factoring N . The second improvement is to change the way to compute multiplication. We use RNS as in Naccache's randomized Rabin function [10] . The resulting scheme is denoted as WIPR-RNS. In WIPR-RNS, we replace the three reversible stream ciphers in WIPR with one regular stream cipher, hence we reduce the hardware cost and provide a better security guarantee. These two approaches can be used together, if desired.
A. WIPR-SAEP 1) Description: We assume that the total number of tags is 2 s where s < 64. This would be sufficient for any conceivable application. The padding scheme is as follows:
where h() is a hash function, |h()| = 128, |r| = 1024 − 128, o is a string of 0, and |o| = 128 − s. This padding is exactly the SAEP padding except that the additional parameter c has been included. Figure 1 illustrates the WIPR-SAEP padding and the Rabin-SAEP padding. The tag then computes y = x 2 + r N and sends y to the reader. The reader solves x 2 mod N = y mod N for x, parses x as x ||r where |x | = 128, then computes x = x ⊕ h(r) ⊕ c. If the low-order 128 − s bits in x are 0, then the high-order s bits comprise the ID.
As in WIPR, x needs to be generated on the fly and in two directions. In WIPR-SAEP, x is generated as follows. First, h(r) is computed. Note that a hash function processes its input in multiple iterations, and the input is divided into continuous fix-sized blocks. In each iteration, one block is read and processed. This allows 5 r to be generated on the fly instead of being stored in RAM. Next, (c⊕(ID||o)⊕h(r)) is computed and stored in the RAM holding c. Then, x can be generated on the fly in two directions by regenerating r on the fly in two directions. Computation of x 2 + r N is the same as in WIPR. Compared to WIPR, WIPR-SAEP only needs one additional hash function.
2) Security Analysis: We describe the following game to define the security and privacy of WIPR-SAEP. The notations r, r , and o are the same as in the description for WIPR-SAEP.
Game 0
• The adversary chooses a random challenge c and two tags ID 0 and ID 1 , and he sends (c, ID 0 , ID 1 ) to the challenger.
• The challenger chooses a random bit b, and a random r, computes x = ((ID b ||o) ⊕ c ⊕ h(r))||r, chooses a random r , computes y = x 2 + r N , and sends y to the adversary.
• The adversary outputs b . If b = b, then the adversary wins. It is clear that, if the adversary cannot win the game, then he cannot track a tag even if he knows the tag ID. Also the adversary cannot recover the ID by querying a tag.
We now describe the following Game 1.
Game 1
• The adversary chooses two random messages m 0 and m 1 where |m 0 | = |m 1 | = s, chooses a random c 2 where |c 2 | = 128 − s, and sends (m 0 , m 1 , c 2 ) to the challenger.
• The challenger chooses a random bit b, and a random r, computes
chooses a random r , computes y = x 2 + r N , and sends y to the adversary.
• The adversary outputs b . If b = b, then the adversary win. Game 1 is the same as a chosen plaintext attack game for Rabin-SAEP, except that the fixed string o is replaced with c 2 . We note that choosing o as all 0s in Rabin-SAEP is arbitrary. Changing it to any other arbitrary string of the same size will not change the security of Rabin-SAEP. 3 Therefore, a polynomial time adversary in Game 1 cannot win the game with non-negligible probability, since Rabin-SAEP is semantically secure under chosen ciphertext attacks [4] , which implies semantic security under chosen plaintext attacks.
Next we show that, if WIPR-SAEP is not secure (i.e., an adversary can win Game 0), then Rabin-SAEP is not secure (i.e., an adversary can win Game 1). Suppose that there is an adversary A that can win Game 0. We construct an adversary A that wins Game 1 as follows.
A
2 +r N , and sends y to the A. A forwards y to A . A returns b to A, and A returns b to C. The process is illustrated in Table I .
In this process, the interaction between C and A is the same as in Game 0.
Note that
Therefore, the interaction between A and A is the same as in Game 1. It is clear that, if A can win Game 1, then A can win Game 0. We conclude that, if Rabin-SAEP is secure, then WIPR-SAEP is secure against tracking even when the tag ID is disclosed, i.e., it provides forward and backward privacy, and the adversary cannot recover an ID by querying a tag.
3) Hash Function Selection: WIPR-SAEP requires a hash function. For RFID tags, block cipher based hash functions are better candidates than dedicated hash functions such as SHA1 and MD5 [6] , [3] . One example of such a hash function is H-PRESENT-128, which provides 128 bit output and requires 2330 hardware gates [3] . Some other hash functions dedicated to highly constrained devices provide other options. SQUASH-128 [13] is a keyed hash functions that takes as input a 64 bit key and a 64 bit message, and outputs a 32 bit message authentication code (MAC). It is expected that SQUASH-128 requires about half of the number of the gates required by GRAIN-128 [7] , which requires 2133 gates. Although SQUASH-128 cannot be directly used in WIPR, very low cost 128-bit hash functions using the similar design may be possible. By using the H-PRESENT-128 hash function, WIPR-SAEP requires a total of 5705 + 2330 = 8035 gates in hardware. 
B. WIPR-RNS
WIPR-RNS aims to reduce the hardware cost of WIPR and to remove the reversible stream ciphers of WIPR, which we consider to be a non-standard cryptographic primitive. Also the authors of WIPR noted that the boolean function used to construct the reversible stream cipher is somewhat insecure. In [10] , RNS is used in the randomized Rabin function. But the goal of [10] is to reduce the time complexity, and several measures are used at the cost of additional ROM space. Here we use RNS to reduce the hardware cost of WIPR, and substitute the three reversible stream ciphers in WIPR with one regular stream cipher. 
After receiving y 1 , . . . , y m , the reader can recover y and proceed with the verification process.
Next, we describe in detail the data representation and computation in Algorithm 1.
A regular stream cipher is used to generate r and r on the fly. Note that in Algorithm 1, r and r do not have to be reversible as in WIPR. Therefore, a regular stream cipher is sufficient for WIPR-RNS. We may choose Grain [8] as the selected stream cipher. Grain uses about 1300 gates and may be the most efficient stream cipher without known flaws.
For the p i 's, we choose the 127 largest 16-bit primes and a set of 16-bit integers {64526, 64541, 64829, 64843, 65463, 65477, 65509}. It can be verified that the integers in the set are coprime. Therefore, the seven selected integers and the 127 primes are coprime and form the basis of an RNS. In this RNS, we can express integers less than 2 2048+93 , which is sufficient for WIPR-RNS. After these 134 coprime numbers are ordered, the difference between any two consecutive numbers is less than 15. Therefore, the 134 16-bit numbers can be stored in 16+4×133 = 548 bits in ROM, which cost 548 gates.
The tag computes x = M IX(c||r||ID) on the fly the same way as in WIPR, except that x is generated in one direction, from most significant bit to least significant bit. Therefore, the reversible stream cipher in WIPR used to generate r in two directions can be replaced with a regular stream cipher.
To compute x i = x mod p i , x is generated on the fly as described above, and x i is computed using plain modular reduction.
N is stored in ROM as in WIPR. It is loaded in RAM on the fly and N i is computed using plain modular reduction. y i = x i 2 + r i N i mod p i is computed using regular multiplication and plain modular reduction.
The above algorithm uses a 32-bit adder and subtractor and a 16-bit multiplier, while the result is 2048+80 bits in length.
2) Analysis: We compare WIPR and WIPR-RNS which uses WIPR padding in hardware cost and computational efficiency. Since we have not implemented WIPR-RNS in hardware, we only give an approximate estimation.
In WIPR-RNS, we use one regular stream cipher to generate r and r , and remove the three reversible stream ciphers in WIPR. This saves about 2500 gates. WIPR-RNS needs additional 548 gates to store the RNS basis. The computing units (adder, subtractor, multiplier, and RAM to hold temporary results) may need several hundred more gates than WIPR. We estimate that more than 1000 gates can be saved in WIPR-RNS. Therefore, the estimated hardware cost of WIPR-RNS is 5705 − 1000 ≈ 4700 gates.
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For time complexity, we compare the number of bit add/substract operations in computing y = x 2 +r N . Let L be the length of x, N and r . Let l be the length of p i . To compute x 2 + r N as shown in Algorithm 1, the program runs m = L/l rounds. In each round, it takes 3(L − 1)l bit operations to compute x i , r i , and N i using plain modular reduction, and 3l 2 + 2l bit operations to compute x i 2 + r i N i mod p i . Therefore, the number of bit operations in WIPR-RNS is approximately L l (3(L − l)l + 3l 2 ) = 3L 2 .
In WIPR, it is approximately 2L 2 . We estimate that WIPR is about 1.5 times faster than WIPR-RNS.
C. Combining SAEP and RNS
WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS use two different approaches to improve the security of WIPR. WIPR-SAEP uses a secure padding, and WIPR-RNS replaces the nonstandard stream cipher with a standard stream cipher. These two approaches can be combined together. The combined approach is the same as WIPR-RNS, except that it computes x = (ID||o) ⊕ c ⊕ h(r)||r instead of x = M IX(c||r||ID). x is generated the same way as described in WIPR-SAEP.
In Table II , we give a summary of the security and the estimated hardware costs of WIPR-SAEP, WIPR-RNS, and WIPR-SAEP-RNS compared with WIPR. We assume that WIPR-SAEP uses a H-PRESENT-128 hash function. 
V. CONCLUSION
We analyzed the security and privacy of the WIPR RFID authentication protocol and proposed two approaches to improve its security and to further reduce its hardware cost. We showed that a reduced version of WIPR is vulnerable to short padding attacks and WIPR needs a random number generator with certain property to withstand reset attacks. We discussed countermeasures to withstand these attacks by properly specifying some details of WIPR. Then we proposed two variants of WIPR, namely, WIPR-SAEP and WIPR-RNS. WIPR-SAEP used SAEP padding to achieve provable security and privacy. WIPR-RNS used RNS computing to reduced the hardware costs of WIPR, and replaced the non-standard reversible stream cipher in WIPR with a standard stream cipher. The two approaches, SAEP padding and RNS computing, can be used together.
